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This article argues that time-asymmetric processes in spacetime are enantiomorphs. Subse-
quently, the Kantian puzzle concerning enantiomorphs in space is reviewed to introduce a
number of positions concerning enantiomorphy, and to arrive at a dilemma: one must
either reject that orientations of enantiomorphs are determinate, or furnish space or objects
with orientation. The discussion on space is then used to derive two problems in the debate
on the direction of time. First, it is shown that certain kinds of reductionism about the
direction of time are at variance with the claim that orientation of enantiomorphic objects
is intrinsic. Second, it is argued that reductive explanations of time-asymmetric processes
presuppose that enantiomorphic processes do not have determinate orientation.
1. Introduction
In the last century, a great deal of literature on the direction of time has accumulated.
Much of this work is dedicated to attempts to reduce the direction of time or the time
asymmetry of processes to other properties of the processes, usually the dynamical laws
governing them, or their boundary conditions. The fact that time-asymmetric
processes are enantiomorphs has not attracted much attention in this literature. This
article explains what it means for processes to be enantiomorphs, and explores some of
the consequences for the debate on the direction of time.
Enantiomorphy of spatial objects is familiar to all of us. We all know that a left hand
cannot, by some suitable combination of shifts and twists, be transformed to fit into a
right-handed glove. Philosophers may be even more familiar with enantiomorphy due
to the argument for the existence of absolute space given by Kant (1768) and the ongo-
ing discussion of this argument in the philosophical literature. The article brings to
bear some insights from this discussion on the discussion concerning the direction of
time. First, certain kinds of reductionism about the direction of time are seen to be
incompatible with the position that enantiomorphic objects have intrinsic orientation.
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Second, reductive explanations of the orientation of processes in time are seen to be at
variance with orientations being determinate.
The article falls into three parts: enantiomorphy of processes, enantiomorphy in
space, and reductionism. In Section 2, the notion of enantiomorphy is made precise.
Section 3 develops the notion of a process as an object in spacetime, and Section 4 then
argues that time-asymmetric processes are in fact enantiomorphic objects. Section 5
discusses Kant’s puzzle on spatial enantiomorphy and zooms in on the problem that
nothing seems to underpin the orientation of enantiomorphic objects. Section 6
discusses the more recent debate over this problem, and arrives at a specific dilemma
for both substantivalists and relationists concerning space: either they must reject the
position that enantiomorphic objects have determinate orientation, or they must
furnish spacetime or processes with further orientation to underpin the determinate
orientation of these objects.
Armed with these insights concerning enantiomorphy in space, and with the further
fact that time-asymmetric processes are enantiomorphic, the article turns to reduction-
ism about the direction of time. Section 7 argues that reductionism of a certain kind,
exemplified by Reichenbach’s identification of the direction of time with the entropy
gradient, must deny that the orientation of enantiomorphic processes is intrinsic.
Following up on this, Section 8 discusses certain reductive explanations of the consis-
tent orientation of enantiomorphic processes. There, the explanations are seen to be
incompatible with the view that the orientation of enantiomorphs is determinate.
2. Enantiomorphy
When is a spatial object enantiomorphic? For certain kinds of spaces, this question has
a clear-cut answer: an object is enantiomorphic relative to a given space if and only if
there is no rigid motion within the space by which the object can be made to coincide
with its mirror image. The following illustrates this definition, and elaborates the
restrictions to space that make the definition applicable.
Let me first present an exemplary case of enantiomorphy. Consider the three two-
dimensional objects in Figure 1, referred to as ‘knees’ in Nerlich (1973). It is easy to
check that knees (a) and (b) can be made to coincide by, for instance, turning knee (b)
through π radians about an axis perpendicular to it, and subsequently moving it along
the paper. It is also apparent that knees (a) and (c) are mirror images: in a mirror, knee
(a) will look exactly like knee (c) as printed on paper. Moreover, knees (a) and (c), like
knees (b) and (c), cannot be made to coincide by shuffling and turning them within the
paper. Because they are mirror images, and at the same time impossible to match, we
call objects (a) and (c), like (b) and (c), incongruent counterparts. Such pairs are then
said to have opposite orientation. All three objects, being incongruent counterparts, are
called enantiomorphic objects, or enantiomorphs for short.
Figure 1 Three knees.
A rigid motion of an object is a continuous motion that leaves the metrical proper-
ties of the object invariant during all the stages of the motion. More specifically, if the
object is defined by a set of points and their distances, then a rigid motion of that object
is any combination of continuous motions of its points in the given space that leaves
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unchanged all distances between the points. For a more elaborate explication of the
notion of rigid motion, see Frederick (1991). Because of continuity, points are not
allowed to make jumps. In Cartesian space, rigid motions are given by the group of
translations and rotations of the object. The shuffling and turning of the three knees
above are just these rotations and translations in a space that is isomorphic to R2. In
general, we can make the shuffling precise with the notion of rigid motion.
So it seems that an object is enantiomorphic if and only if it cannot by rigid
motions be made to coincide with its mirror image. But this definition is deficient in a
number of ways, and it must therefore be restricted to objects in spaces of a certain
kind. For one thing, in a space that has variable curvature, rigid motion may be
impossible, because the curvature may cause the metrical properties of the object to
change during any motion. But it seems wrong to deem objects enantiomorphic
solely in virtue of that. In the following, I therefore want to restrict the definition of
enantiomorphic objects to the cases in which space has constant curvature, such as
the flat metric. However, even within this specific domain of application, there are
two further caveats. First, incongruent counterparts can be made to coincide by rigid
motions within higher dimensions. Second, such objects can be made to coincide by
rigid motions in spaces with a nonstandard topology. These special rigid motions are
discussed below.
First, I treat rigid motions within higher dimensions. Consider the example with the
knees once again. It is easy to see that knees (a) and (c) can be made to coincide by lifting
knee (a) from the paper, turning it through π radians about some axis parallel to the
paper sheet, and putting it back on the paper again. In other words, the two-dimensional
knees (a) and (c) in the paper sheet, a space isomorphic to R2, can be made to coincide
by rigid motion in the space containing the paper sheet, which is isomorphic to R3.
Should we consequently say that knees (a) and (c) are not enantiomorphs after all?
Rather, we will say that the enantiomorphy of an object is a notion relative to the space
in which the object is considered. So, the characterization of enantiomorphy becomes:
an object is enantiomorphic relative to a space.
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 1 Three knees.
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Second, nonstandard topologies must be taken into consideration. An example of a
two-dimensional space with nonstandard topology is the Möbius band. But to get a
rough idea, it is perhaps easier to do a folding exercise. Consider the knees in Figure 1.
To construct a two-dimensional space with a nonstandard topology, take the lower
outside corner of the page on which this figure is printed and loosely fold it over, so that
it touches the page just below knee (b), over the whole width of this knee. Then imagine
we transport knee (b) by rigid motion over the twisted two-dimensional space we have
just created, onto the back of the page.1 Imagine further that you are able to see through
the page. It then appears that object (b) can be made to coincide with object (c). More-
over, in the two-dimensional space R2 to which the paper is isomorphic, being on the
front or the back of a page is not a real difference. Finally, the knee keeps its metrical
properties during the motion over the twisted space: the space is curved extrinsically,
but internally flat. So we may say that objects (b) and (c) can be made to coincide by
rigid motion after all, by placing them in a two-dimensional space with a particular twist.
In reaction to this, one can say that in twisted spaces like the Möbius band, we simply
do not find enantiomorphic objects. But it is not unthinkable that someone will want
to call oppositely oriented knees on a Möbius strip enantiomorphic after all. To that
aim, we may exclude rigid motions over trajectories that cannot be contracted to a
point. As far as I can see, this rules out rigid motions over Möbius-type twists.
However, the safe option is to restrict the domain of applicability of the definition a bit
further, and to remain silent on enantiomorphy in spaces like the Möbius band. The
following therefore employs the definition of enantiomorphy only in spaces that are
simply connected and thus have a completely standard topology. The restriction is too
strong, but for present purposes this is not damaging.2
3. Processes in Spacetime
In this section, I define a process as an object in flat Minkowski spacetime. I then
discuss time asymmetry of processes, and define the mirror image of a process as the
time reversal of that process.
3.1. Processes as Objects
Consider a simply connected and flat Minkowski spacetime M with events x ∈ M,
together with a Lorentz coordinate framework relativised to some observer. Over the
spacetime, the framework defines a time function τ(x) of the observer, and a function
that assigns every event spatial coordinates, ξ(x). Thus, we can talk of the events in
terms of unique observer-relative coordinates 〈τ, ξ〉. In this context, it is important to
note that the time function does not in any way relate to the direction of time: it is
simply a conventional labelling.
Relative to the observer, we may now define a process as an object in spacetime. First,
we localise the process in a specific spacetime region, and divide the region into time
slices, that is, into parts that have the same time coordinate. Second, the respective
times can be associated with states of a certain process in some state space. The process
International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 171
in spacetime is then defined by assigning these states to the time slices with the corre-
sponding times. The following makes this idea precise.
Consider a process p in a limited spacetime region around the origin of the coordinate
frame, Mp = {x: τ(x) ∈ Ip, |ξ| < Dp}. Here, Dp ∈ R is the radius of a spatial sphere, and
Ip = [−T, +T] ⊂ R is the time interval. The region Mp determines the place and interval
within which the process p occurs. We can define a time slicing of the region Mp as follows: 
Time slicing p: A time slicing for a specific observer is a partition p of the region
Mp into subsets Mp(t) such that ∀x : x ∈ Mp(t) ⇔ τ(x) = t.
This definition entails that the union of all time slices is again the region, ∪tMp(t)
= Mp, and further that the time slices do not intersect, ∀t ≠ t′ : Mp(t) ∩ Mp(t′) = Ø.
Note that the slicing is specific to the observer and her coordinate frame.
The region Mp is supposed to contain a system undergoing some process. Denote the
set of state descriptions for the system with . We can define a process in the state space
as follows: 
Process S(t): A process in state space is a function S : Ip [map   ]   of parameters t ∈ Ip =
[−T, +T] to state descriptions S(t) ∈ .
The argument t of the process S signals that state descriptions are assigned to times. We
can now situate the process in spacetime by assigning the state descriptions of a process
S(t) to the time slicing Mp(t) in the manifold. 
Process : A process  in spacetime, for a specific observer, is a function
: p [map   ]   of time slices in a spacetime region, Mp(t) ∈ p, to state
descriptions in a state space, S(t) ∈ , according to  [Mp(t)] = S(t).
A process in spacetime  thus assigns a state description to every time-slice of the
region Mp within which the process takes place.
Note that the process  is defined relative to an observer in a specific inertial frame.
Events that are simultaneous to one observer may, according to another observer, be
part of time slices that are assigned different state descriptions. As a result, one process
in spacetime has as many different representations  as there are inertial frames. To
ensure that transformations from one inertial frame to another do not change the order
of the states in the process representation, we must assume that the states S(t) in the
state space describe a causal process. If the states describe a so-called pseudo-process,
such as the positions of a shadow moving along a wall, the order of the states may differ
from one observer to another.
It may finally be noted that the assignment [Mp(t)] does not necessarily result in
a full description of the state of affairs in the time-slice Mp(t). The state space  may
consist of thermodynamical properties, while the full state of affairs consists of config-
urations of particles. This is not a problem as long as the states are connected causally.
3.2. Asymmetry and Mirror Image in Space
Before defining time asymmetry of processes and the time reversal of a process, it is










Let me first define a spatial object b in a way similar to the processes defined above.
We can partition space into parallel planes ( j), perpendicular to a vector j and
parametrised by it. To these planes, we can assign the spatial intersections of the object
b and other qualities such as colour and weight, summarized in the form descriptions
F( j). The object is thus represented by a function bF[ ( j)] = F( j). Note that the parti-
tioning is assumed to be spaced according to the metric given by j. Note also that there
are many different representations of the same object b depending on the initial choice
of the vector j, in the same way that there are many representations of a process p
depending on the choice of inertial frame. Recall that representations of processes
pertain to the same process if they employ the same ordered set of state descriptions.
For representations of spatial objects, the equivalence of representations is less obvious,
but this need not bother us here.
For spatial objects, it is easy to characterise the notions of asymmetry and mirror
image. First, an object is called asymmetric in the direction of j if there is no plane
perpendicular to j around which the form descriptions are pairwise identical, that is,
if there is no plane ( j) such that F( j − j′) = F( j′ − j) for all j′. Second, the mirror
image of a spatial object is characterised by a parity transformation of the object with
respect to one of the spatial coordinates. In the above representation, a parity trans-
formation with respect to j is effected by changing the vector j into −j, leaving the
function bF unchanged. So, the mirror image of an object, denoted b*F , is defined by
assigning the form descriptions F( j) to the parallel planes ( j) in opposite order:
b*F [ ( j)] = F(−j).
Note that whether an object is deemed asymmetric in the above sense is in part deter-
mined by the spacing of the vector j. Moreover the spacing must be fixed during the
mirror image transformation, because if we allow the spacing to vary, objects with
different shapes can be constructed as mirror images of each other. The simplest solu-
tion for this is to suppose space to be flat, so that the spacing is equidistant. Note also
that the parity transformation is defined for a specific coordinate. It is a further fact
about Cartesian space that parity transformations with respect to different coordinates
are effectively the same operation. Finally, note that an object is symmetric exactly if
there is a plane ( j) that cuts the object into halves that are mirror images. If the object
has more than one plane of symmetry, these halves are identical.
3.3. Time-Asymmetry and Reversal of Processes
We can now define the notion of time reversal and time-asymmetry as the analogues
of the mirror image and asymmetry of an object in a certain direction. As an illustra-
tion, take a cooling poker that is first white and very hot, then traverses several shades
of red and orange, and finally cools down to black. Let the set of state descriptions
consist of a suitable set of colours, conveniently ordered so that we can define the
process S as a trajectory in this colour space. As for the spacetime region, take a fixed
sphere |ξ| < Dp containing the poker. For convenience, define the period of cooling as
Ip = [−1, +1]. The assignment of the subsequent colours to the time slices of the selected
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Much like the object bF, the process  is given by an assignment of certain descrip-
tions, consisting of colour states, to a partition, consisting of time slices in a flat
Minkowski spacetime. Note that there is no real analogue for the intersections, which
are part of the form descriptions F( j), since the spatiotemporal extension of the process
is fixed by the region Mp. Also note that the analogue of the direction j in the spacetime
case is the direction of the time axis in the inertial frame.
Using this analogy, we say that the process  is time-asymmetric if there is no time-
slice around which the state descriptions are pairwise identical. Because of the defini-
tion of the spacetime region with Ip = [−1, +1], the time slice that cuts the process in
halves is Mp(0), so that the identity of the halves comes down to the pairwise identity
S(0 + t) = S(0 − t) for all t ∈ Ip. So we say that a process  is time-asymmetric if this
pairwise identity does not hold. It will be clear that in this definition, the example
process comes out as time-asymmetric. With the same analogy, the time-reversed
process  is a function of the partition of time slices p to the state space  in which
the order of the states in S(t) is reversed. That is, the states of S(t) are assigned to the
time slices in reverse order: [Mp(t)] = S(−t). In the example of the cooling poker, if
the process  has S(−1) = ‘white’ and S(+1) = ‘black’, its reversal  has the opposite
state assignments, S(−1) = ‘black’ and S(+1) = ‘white’. It may be observed immediately
that an asymmetric process and its time reversal are therefore not identical in any
straightforward manner.
There are some complications with the definition of time reversal when the state
descriptions S contain velocities or other change-related state descriptions. In the
example, imagine that apart from the colour of the poker, we keep record of whether
the poker is cooling down or heating up, so that typical states in the process are 〈orange,
cooling〉, 〈red, cooling〉, and so on. The reversal process then is a rather strange one if
considered in the same time direction: the poker changes from ‘black’ and therefore
cool to ‘white’ and therefore hot, while during this process it is ‘cooling’ all the time. In
other words, state descriptions with change-related properties only seem natural when
considered relative to a particular time direction.
One way to avoid this is by leaving such change-related elements out of the state
descriptions of the process, as proposed by Albert (2000) and Arntzenius (2000).
Another option is to stay closer to the state descriptions of physics, which typically
include change-related properties, and associate a transformation of state descriptions
with the time-reversal operation. This more common view is defended in Earman
(2002) and Smith (2003). While the debate over this issue is certainly not settled, the
result of this discussion only becomes relevant to the present article if we say that the
change-related state descriptions with opposite temporal orientation differ intrinsi-
cally, in which case they supposedly determine the orientation of the process. All this is
discussed in more detail below.
4. Enantiomorphic Processes
Having defined time asymmetry and reversals of processes, what can we say of the








be viewed as enantiomorphs. This conclusion directly counters Reichenbach’s conten-
tion in (1958, 109) that ‘time does not have the problem of mirror-image congruence’.
The argument is an elaboration and extension of Earman’s remark (1971, 13–14), that
it is impossible to transform a timelike vector pointing in one direction into a vector
pointing in the opposite direction. A comparable but less explicit discussion can
further be found in Le Poidevin (1994).
Note first that the setting for processes fulfils the conditions required for the defini-
tion of enantiomorphy to apply. The region Mp is a maximal subset of M, in the sense
that it has the same number of dimensions. Further, the manifold M has a flat metrical
structure, and it is simply connected. So, the question on the enantiomorphy of
processes comes down to the question of whether a process can be made to coincide
with its mirror image by a so-called continuous rigid motion. It must be stressed that
the motions I am concerned with are not ordinary motions happening within space-
time. A rigid motion of the process of a cooling poker is not the same as rigidly moving
the poker in space. In the following, I therefore talk of allowed transformations instead
of rigid motions, because these do not have the unintended temporal connotation.
Finally, as suggested by the above characterisations, the mirror image of a process is
taken to be the time reversal of the process.
Now, what transformations are allowed in spacetime? Recall that rigid motions of
objects are given by those continuous motions of labelled points in the object that
preserve the distances between all the points. Instead of continuous motions, we must
talk here of continuous translations. For an object represented with two points, the
allowed transformations are therefore exactly those translations of the points that leave
the distance between them unchanged. Now, the distance functions for two points in
Newtonian and Minkowski spacetime, using 1 space and 1 time dimension, respec-
tively, are as follows: 
These distance functions define the allowed transformations for objects represented
with two points in these respective spaces. Note that the Newtonian spacetime comes
down to two-dimensional Cartesian space.
Figure 2 illustrates the difference between the allowed transformations in two-dimen-
sional Cartesian space and those in a Minkowski space with one spatial and one timelike
dimension. The lines denote all possible positions for the endpoint of a vector originating
in  that can be reached by allowed transformations of the vector, leaving aside trans-
formations that come down to a shift of . It appears that a vector in Newtonian or Carte-
sian space, which has  = +1, can be moved to point in any direction. A timelike vector
in Minkowski space, however, that has  = −1 cannot be transformed continuously into
an arrow that is oriented oppositely. The dotted line denotes the endpoints of timelike
vectors with  = −1 that cannot be reached by an allowed transformation. Therefore,
in a Minkowski metric, oppositely oriented timelike vectors cannot be made to coincide.
Figure 2 Newtonian and Minkowski metric.
Now consider once again the cooling poker of the previous section. We can repre-
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states S(−1) = ‘white’ and S(+1) = ‘black’ to the first and last spheres, respectively. And
as indicated, we can construct the reversal of this simplified process by attaching the
states in opposite order, i. e. S(−1) = ‘black’ and S(+1) = ‘white’. But for the above
reasons, the time-like separated black and white spheres can never change place by
allowed transformations of the hypercylinder. The process of the cooling poker and its
reversal cannot therefore be made to coincide, as shown in Figure 3.
Figure 3 Oppositely oriented, asymmetric processes in spacetime.
This result easily generalizes to the fact that there is no asymmetric process which can
be made to coincide with its time reversal in spacetime. Of any asymmetric process, we
can label the temporal endpoints with ‘black’ and ‘white’, so that the process and its
reversal cannot be made to coincide for the same reason as the example process. The
conclusion is that time-asymmetric processes and their time reversals are enantiomor-
phic objects in Minkowksi spacetime. Each time-asymmetric process comes in two
t t
x x





Figure 3 Oppositely oriented, asymmetric processes in spacetime.
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versions, which may be labelled + and −. Note that this labelling is deliberately not asso-
ciated with the notions of past and future, which inherently depend on the temporal
perspective of the observer.3
5. Enantiomorphy in Space
The first main result of this article is simply that time-asymmetric processes are enan-
tiomorphs in spacetime. The remainder of the article considers some of the conse-
quences of this fact for the discussion on the direction of time. Specifically, it focuses
on consequences for reductionism about the direction of time and reductive explana-
tions of the time asymmetry of processes. To this aim, I first bring to the fore some
results in the debate on enantiomorphy and space. In particular, this section discusses
the well-known argument of Kant in order to introduce some positions and distinc-
tions that concern space and enantiomorphy. It must be emphasized that the aim of
this section is not to give a survey of Kant’s argument itself.
5.1. The Puzzle and Kant’s Argument
Imagine a single hand in an otherwise empty space, and for the moment, assume that
the hand is left. We can then ask what property or state of affairs makes this hand left.
To answer this question, we may start out citing properties of the hand, such as its
weight, temperature, the lengths of the fingers, the distances and angles between them,
and so on. But we will not succeed in finding a property that determines whether the
hand is left or right, unless we cite something like the property that on the side of the
palm, turning the thumb towards the fingers is a clockwise movement. But this sort of
property seems to take as basic the orientation we were trying to spell out. It could
equally well have read: if viewed from the arm on the side of the palm, the thumb is left
of the fingers. It seems that a hand’s being left or right, its orientation for short, cannot
be based on anything but orientation itself.
The above puzzle has played an important role in the controversy over the existence
of absolute space. Kant has used the puzzle in an argument purporting to show that
relationism about space is untenable. His later argument concerning the intuitive
nature of space is briefly considered in the next subsection. But first I provide a variant
of the earlier argument to elaborate the relation between enantiomorphy and various
views on space and objects. As indicated, this reconstruction is not faithful to the
original text of Kant (1768).
The argument is a reductio ad absurdum. Here is an almost exhaustive list of
premises: 
DET: the orientation of an enantiomorphic object is determinate.
GEO: an orientation of an enantiomorphic object is a geometric property of that
object.
REL: geometric properties of objects are made determinate by relations between
objects and their parts, or they are indeterminate.
ORI-R: relations between objects and their parts do not directly refer to orientation.4
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GEO-R: without direct reference to orientation, relations between objects and their
parts do not make determinate an orientation of an enantiomorphic object.
With relations between objects and their parts I mean both intra-object and inter-
object relations. Note that apart from DET, all premises speak of ‘an orientation’ and
not of ‘the orientation’
The derivation employs all premisses apart from DET. Together they prove that an
enantiomorphic object does not have a determinate orientation. The derivation
assumes that the relation ‘is made determinate by’ is transitive. 
⇒ 1: an orientation of an enantiomorphic object is made determinate by relations
among objects and their parts, or it is indeterminate (GEO, REL).
⇒ 2: an orientation of an enantiomorphic object is made determinate by relations
among objects and their parts that do not refer to orientation, or it is indeter-
minate (ORI-R, 1).
⇒ 3: an orientation of an enantiomorphic object is indeterminate (GEO-R, 2).
Statement 3 directly contradicts premise DET. One possible reaction to this is to dispose
of REL, and thus to claim that relationism fails. While the above is of course an anach-
ronistic and simplifying reconstruction, the conclusion of Kant’s (1768) argument is
indeed that REL has to be rejected. Kant further contended that by using absolute space,
the orientation of a lone hand can be determined unproblematically.
5.2. Two Aspects of the Puzzle
Below we come back to this contention, and to the alleged problem for relationism. In
this subsection I want to draw attention to certain aspects of the above argument, relat-
ing to two possible meanings of being determinate, and to the further specification of
the orientation of enantiomorphic objects as an intrinsic property.
First, let me present the eventual solution of Kant to the puzzle and, by means of that,
distinguish two problems inherent to it. In his 1783 argument, Kant arrives at the
conclusion that space is c. ‘…the form of the external intuition of this sensibility’,
where sensibility refers to the capacity to frame and organise sense experience of things
in a spatial scheme. The rough idea is that space, which is external to us, is the form of
a capacity that we observers have, internally, to frame and organise experiences. Our
internal capacity to frame things is thus made constitutive of the things as they appear
to us, that is, of the things as spatial objects. This move enables Kant to solve the puzzle
of enantiomorphy. In an anachronistic reformulation, it is in the cognitive act of fram-
ing an enantiomorphic object that it has a determinate orientation, and moreover, this
framing is constitutive of the object.
The Kantian solution signals the merger of two essentially distinct problems in the
puzzle. Following similar distinctions in Hoefer (2000), Huggett (2000) and Pooley
(2003), I will distinguish the epistemic and the ontological variant. The epistemic prob-
lem addresses what conceptual or cognitive tool makes the orientation of an enantio-
morphic object determinate for us. The ontological problem addresses what element of
reality makes the orientation of an enantiomorphic object determinate for itself. Kant
solves the epistemic problem, and, with the Kantian move to take modes of cognition
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as constitutive of the things for us, claims the ontological problem solved, too. Now I
do not want to assess this eventual solution here. I bring it up because it highlights that
there are really two distinct problems in the puzzle. This runs parallel to the fact that in
the above argument, the term ‘determinate’ can be given two different meanings,
which reflect these two problems: one concerns the determination relative to a concep-
tual scheme, and the other concerns the determination of properties of a thing in the
world. What I want to emphasize here is that the following concerns the ontological
determinateness only.
The second aspect concerns the notion of ontological determinateness in relation to
whether the orientation of enantiomorphic objects may be called intrinsic. In the orig-
inal puzzle of Kant, the subject matter is not just any enantiomorphic object, but more
specifically a single object in otherwise empty space, namely a lone hand. If anywhere,
the ontological basis for the orientation of the hand must therefore be located in the
hand itself. It may thus seem natural to provide an underpinning for the premise DET
in terms of intrinsic properties, according to 
INT: an orientation of an enantiomorphic object is an intrinsic property.
IND: intrinsic properties are determinate independently of other objects or facts.
From these two premises, we can easily derive DET. Moreover, following Le Poidevin
(1994), we may take IND as a definition. In that case, denying DET comes down to an
immediate denial of INT.
The explication of determinateness in terms of intrinsic properties is not wholly
unproblematic. First of all, the working definition IND may well run into problems when
used in combination with the Kantian perspective proposed in the 1783 argument. In
this perspective, the orientation of an enantiomorphic object is intrinsic but at the same
time related to the spatial scheme that we use to frame the object. Note also that the intrin-
sicality of orientation is logically stronger than the determinateness. Maintaining the
determinateness of orientation does not mean that the orientation is also taken to be
intrinsic, because the determinateness of orientation may be due to space itself or other
objects in it. The following will take care to separate arguments in which the intrinsicality
of orientation is at stake from stronger arguments that only concern the determinateness.
Summing up, this article focuses on the ontological aspect of enantiomorphy: not
the epistemic determination of orientation, but the ontological basis of the determi-
nateness, is at stake in the arguments. Moreover, this ontological basis may reside in the
enantiomorphic object itself, in which case the determinateness may be spelled out in
terms of intrinsic properties, but also in the relation the object has to space, as a
substance or a construction of relations, or other objects. These two possibilities
become relevant for the way in which the positions in this argument carry over to the
discussion of enantiomorphic processes in spacetime.
6. A Dilemma on Enantiomorphy
This section elaborates on determinateness as defined in the above argument, and
shows that the argument presents a problem to both relationists and substantivalists
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with respect to space. Specifically, both positions are confronted with a dilemma: either
it must be accepted that the orientation of enantiomorphs is indeterminate, or an inde-
pendent notion of orientation to objects, space or spatial relations must be introduced.
This latter option is connected to a denial of reductionism with respect to orientation,
which leads up to the next two sections on enantiomorphy and reductionism about the
direction of time and orientation in time.
6.1. Indeterminate Orientation
Kant uses the argument of the preceding section to argue against relationism, as voiced
in REL. In an attempt to save REL, Remnant (1963) advances the idea that a relationist
can deny DET. To this aim, he reconsiders the example Kant used to explain the deter-
minateness of the orientation of a hand, imagining a handless and perfectly symmetri-
cal human body to determine where the hand fits. He then argues: ‘… even though it
is quite determinate which arm the hand belongs on, it remains completely indetermi-
nate whether this is a right or a left arm and consequently indeterminate whether the
hand is right or left’. It must first be noted that the presence of the handless human
body does not alter the import of the argument by Kant, which, strictly speaking,
concerns lone hands. The symmetric human body cannot be used to make the orien-
tation of the lone hand determinate, so that relationism is still at risk.
As indicated in the quote, Remnant accepts that the lone hand is an enantiomorph,
and thus fits only one particular arm. So he accepts that the hand has an orientation.
But he denies that it is determinate which arm the hand fits on, and thus whether the
hand is left or right. To appreciate this, it is important to distinguish yet again two ways
of having determinate orientation, next to its epistemic and ontological meanings: an
enantiomorphic object is by its very nature determinate in having some orientation as
opposed to not having any orientation at all, whereas it need not be determinate in
having a particular orientation as opposed to having the opposite orientation. Accord-
ing to Remnant, Kant is wrong in holding that the hand has a determinate orientation
in the latter sense. Remnant concludes that absolute space need not be invoked to
explain anything.
6.2. Relationist Dilemma
The move of Remnant has elicited several responses,5 of which I will mention those of
Nerlich (1973) and Earman (1971).
Nerlich distinguishes between the two above ways of having a determinate orienta-
tion and argues that the argument against relationism can still be run using the fact that
certain objects are enantiomorphs: it is perhaps not the particular orientation of a lone
hand that needs an explanation, but the fact that such a hand is an enantiomorph
remains. It is up to the relationist to give an explication of this. However, as suggested
by Pooley (2003), the relationist can react to Nerlich in a way that is similar to the
response of Remnant. She may deny that single objects in otherwise empty space are
enantiomorphic.
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The objection of Earman is that the absence of other oriented objects can never cause
the lone hand to suddenly stop having a particular orientation: ‘the parity operation …
for the room I am now sitting in would not collapse if all the objects in it save one hand
were to vanish’. The point is that the parity operation, which turns any object into its
mirror image and which for a hand is surely not equal to identity in full space, cannot
suddenly turn into identity because space is evacuated.6 Minimally, the relationist must
give an explication of the parity operation in which this is made clear.
It is not clear that the suggestion of Earman harms the relationist who denies DET.
For a relationist like Remnant, when it comes to the ontological aspect of enantiomor-
phy, orientations of enantiomorphic objects are indeterminate in the vicinity of other
objects just as well. A relationist description of both a left and a right hand in otherwise
empty space, as long as it only employs distances, does not encode which of the two is
the left one either. There is no need for the relationist to explain the magical disappear-
ance of the element of reality that determines the orientation of one hand if the other
hand is removed, because according to at least some relationist conceptions, there is no
such element of reality.
In any case, there is no need to rely on the relationist reactions above. Also for less
radical relationists, who want to admit that a lone hand is determinate in being enan-
tiomorph or that a hand is determinate in having a particular orientation in the pres-
ence of its counterpart, the responses of Nerlich and Earman do not rule out a
relationist denial of DET. At best, they indicate that a relationist explication of enantio-
morphy and spatial notions like parity and orientability has not yet been given. Nerlich
and Earman have not shown that a relationist can never give these explications. Once
their challenges are taken up, as they are by Pooley (2003) and Huggett (2003), it seems
quite possible to deny DET. The other possibility for the relationist, suggested in Earman
(1989) and more elaborately discussed in Pooley (2003), is to deny ORI-R, and to accept
a relation such as ‘left of’ in the range of possible geometric relations. This comes down
to supplying the relationist conception of space with further oriented relations that fix
the orientation. A final relationist escape from the argument may be to deny GEO. I
know of no such attempt in the literature and will myself not follow that track either.
To sum up, in response to the Kantian puzzle, the relationist can deny either DET or
ORI-R. This is the basic dilemma for relationists. Now, it seems that the latter option is
in direct opposition to reductionist views on orientation. But before making this
precise, let me discuss the dilemma for substantivalists in the next subsection.
6.3. Substantivalist Dilemma
Earman (1971) challenges Kant’s (1768) contention concerning the use of absolute
space in determining the orientation of a lone hand. He notes, as Kant himself seems
to do in (1783), that supplying the setting of the lone hand with the further presence of
space substance is of itself not sufficient to solve the puzzle. Just as distances between
parts of the hand do not suffice to determine orientation, distances between the hand
and spatial points outside the hand will not do the job, either. But what else, Earman
asks, can be the special property of absolute space that allows for the determination of
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a lone hand as having a particular orientation? Kant’s suggestion that it is ‘universal space
as a unity of which every extension must be regarded as a part’ is notoriously unhelpful.
Earman concludes that thus far, no satisfactory answer to this question has been given.
Nerlich makes clear that there is a way in which absolute space determines enantio-
morphy: it is because space is three-dimensional and simply connected that we call
certain objects enantiomorphs. So, one interpretation of the above suggestion of Kant
is that absolute space determines the lone hand in being enantiomorphic. Moreover, as
indicated above, it seems possible to restate the argument against relationism, so that
it is concerned with being enantiomorphic. One may even conjecture that Kant
intended the argument like that, although this is certainly not the claim of Nerlich.
However, no matter how we read the original argument by Kant, it is simply not the
case that substantival space determines a lone hand in having a particular orientation.
The reformulation which Nerlich proposes does not help against that.
Hoefer (2000) picks up this line of argument. He shows that if space points are
supposed to have primitive identity, a substantivalist can determine the orientation of
an enantiomorphic object after all. With this additional insight, we are in the position
to reiterate the argument of Section 5.1 for substantivalists. The premise REL must be
replaced with 
SUB: geometric properties of objects are made determinate by the points they occupy
in substantival space, or they are indeterminate.
The premise that relationists do not employ relations that refer to orientation must be
replaced with the premise that absolute space does not have primitive identity of space
points. That is, we must replace ORI-R and GEO-R with 
ORI-S: points in space do not have primitive identity.
GEO-S: without primitive identity of points in space, absolute space does not make
determinate an orientation of an enantiomorphic object.
With the adapted argument, we can force the substantivalist into a dilemma as well,
namely to reject DET or ORI-S. That is, space must be decorated with primitive identity
for the points, or the determinateness of orientations will have to be denied.
There is an obvious similarity between the premises ORI-R and ORI-S. In both cases,
their denial comes down to a denial of a kind of reductionism about orientation. For a
relationist, accepting relations that directly refer to orientation means that orientation
is included in the basic ontology of spatial relations. And similarly for a substantivalist,
saying that space points have primitive identity also means that orientations in space
have a primitive identity. We may therefore say that substantivalists and relationists
face the same dilemma, which is to deny a kind of reductionism about orientation, in
the following referred to with RED, or to deny that enantiomorphic objects have deter-
minate orientation, denoted DET.
7. Reduction of Time Direction
In the remaining sections, I employ the positions and dilemma of the foregoing in a
discussion on reductionism in time and enantiomorphic processes. Specifically, this
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section deals with a certain kind of reductionism about the direction of time. The
exemplary case is Reichenbach’s attempt to reduce the direction of time to the entropy
gradient. Other examples are reductions of the direction of time to cosmological
processes, as in Hawkings’ article in Halliwell, Perez-Mercader, and Zurek (1994). I
argue that such reductionism is at variance with INT, the claim that orientation of enan-
tiomorophic objects is intrinsic. The argument employs the relation between the
intrinsicality of orientation and its being determinate, and assumes the above charac-
terisations of several positions regarding enantiomorphy.
7.1. Reichenbach’s Proposal
Reichenbach (1956) aims to reduce the direction of time to the global entropy gradient.
His claim is that any further feature of processes pertaining to a particular orientation
in time can ultimately be traced back to the global asymmetry of entropy increase in the
large-scale physical process of which these processes are part. The fact, for instance,
that pokers on earth always decrease in temperature in the future direction can be
reduced to the asymmetry of a more global entropy gradient. Figure 4 depicts the
reduction that Reichenbach has in mind. The curve shows the possibility that the
entropy gradients are zero or oppose each other globally.
Figure 4 Global entropy curve and resulting time direction.
Following Sklar (1995), I stress two features of the intended reduction. First, the
reduction is scientific as opposed to epistemological. It is not the epistemic access we
have to time direction or some inner sense of tense that is at stake. The reduction aims
at a veritable bridge law between time direction and entropy gradient. Second, accord-
ing to Sklar, the reduction of past–future to the entropy gradient resembles the reduc-
tion of up–down to the gravitational gradient on earth rather than the reduction of the
left–right distinction to violation of parity symmetry in weak nuclear interactions.
As an example of the latter kind of reduction, dexterity of humans may be said to







Figure 4 Global entropy curve and resulting time direction.
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weak interactions which violate parity symmetry. That is, if we had to communicate the
dexterity of humans to extraterrestrials by radio communication, describing an exper-
iment with such weak interactions can be used to get this information across. Apart
from the fact that we may object to this being called a reduction, the identification of
time direction with the entropy gradient is more than such a contingent correlation.
The claim is that all further time-asymmetric features can be traced back to the entropy
gradient, as is the case in the reduction of up–down to the gravitational gradient. As
in the up–down case, the entropy gradient is supposed to be foundational for any
directionality that resides in natural processes.
One further remark must be made to qualify the reductionism that is at stake. The
reduction of the direction of time to the entropy gradient is a reduction of direction in
the sense of elimination: in the reducing theory, there is no reference to directions of
time or orientation in time. We may decide to reduce the direction of time to, for
example, the direction of causal efficacy, as discussed in Le Poidevin (1994). Such
causal reductions do not run into the problems discussed below, because they refer to
a primitive notion of direction in time. However, such reductions do not eliminate the
notion of direction. The reductionism at stake in this article does not include reduc-
tions of this latter kind.
Finally, let me consider the reach of the problems discussed here. First, it must be
admitted that Reichenbach is not the most recent proponent for the kind of reduction-
ism at stake. However, his reduction is relatively simple, and most suitable for illustrat-
ing the more general conclusion in this section. Second, it may be argued that there are
very few proponents of the strong form of reductionism discussed here. But it is prob-
ably more appropriate to say that those in favour of reducing the direction of time to
other notions are not always explicit on the points considered above. Finally, it is nota-
ble that in physics, as in Wald (1984, 60, chap. 8), it is standard usage to supply space-
time with further oriented structure. However, this cannot be taken as the endpoint of
discussions on reductionism about the direction of time and orientation in time, since
we may still ask for the physical principles underlying this direction. The following
argues that in answering this question, we run into trouble with enantiomorphy.
7.2. Problems for Reductionism
I now turn to the problems that the intrinsic orientation of time-asymmetric processes
poses for the above form of reductionism. The key ingredients are the features of the
intended reduction emphasized above: the reduction being foundational, the fact that
a notion of global direction is not present in the reducing theory, and associated with
that, the possibility of globally opposing directions of time. The problems can be illus-
trated with Figure 5, in which objects with black and white circular ends represent
several processes of pokers cooling down or heating up. The directions of time derive
from Figure 4.
Figure 5 Time directions and mirror-image processes.
Since the reduction is supposed to be foundational, the orientation of the processes
in the above spacetime is determined by the direction of time defined in it. However,
on the above assignment of directions, this leads to problematic scenarios in the
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regions of spacetime in which there is a direction of time. For instance, the two
processes depicted there come out as having the same orientation: in relation to the
time direction of the spacetime region, both processes are oriented identically. But we
can move one process and bring it over to the other segment by continuous translation
over a timelike line, which is an allowed transformation, and after this translation the
processes turn out to be incongruent counterparts. Similarly, if we imagine the two
regions with opposite time direction as containing two processes (which, according to
the local time directions, have opposing orientations), then these orientations can be
made the same by moving one process to the other region.
Both scenarios are at variance with the view that the orientation of a process is intrin-
sic, as voiced in INT. The general point is simply that time-asymmetric processes cannot
have intrinsic orientation if this orientation depends on a locally defined direction of
time. But let me make this a bit more specific. First, in accordance with the reduction
being scientific rather than epistemic, the foregoing concerns the ontological basis for
the intrinsic orientation of the processes. Second, this ontological basis is not just about
the processes being enantiomorphic but about their having a specific and determinate
orientation. Third, the fact that the orientation is supposed to be intrinsic means that
time-asymmetric processes have a determinate orientation that is independent of
spacetime or other objects in it, and thus also independent of convention, setting or
perspective. However, following the examples above, orientations of time-asymmetric
processes are not independent of other processes if we employ the reduction of the
direction of time to the entropy gradient. The conclusion must be that the reduction
only works if we deny INT in the first place.
It is important to keep in mind that the problem derives its force from the enantio-
morphic character of processes, and not just from their being time-asymmetric. The
parallel with spatial enantiomorphy is very useful here. Imagine a symmetric chair
facing away from the entrance of an office, and consider the case in which we rigidly
move this chair into the office on the opposite side of the corridor. This other office is
oppositely oriented in space, and since we have rigidly moved the chair, it now faces




Figure 5 Time directions and mirror-image processes.
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be clear that this is not the kind of orientation change that makes the above scenario
with processes problematic. After all, we still want to say that the moved chair is the
very same chair. The problem with moving the enantiomorphic processes is more like
rigidly moving a right slipper to the other office and noticing, stupefied, that in the
other office the slipper is left. It is because we feel the orientation to be intrinsic to the
slipper, or at least determinate independently of the office in which the slipper is situ-
ated, that this scenario is problematic.
7.3. Reductionist Replies
As a first reaction to this conclusion, a reductionist may claim that, apart from the
entropy gradient, we still have some kind of metrical notion of time direction to discern
incongruent counterpart processes. But remember that Reichenbach intended to
identify time direction with the entropy gradient, and that this gradient was supposed
to be foundational for all other directionality of processes in time, as in the up–down
reduction. Certainly, it remains a possibility for the reductionist to reduce only some
of the aspects of directionality to the entropy gradient, and leave others aside, but in my
view this must be considered as a withdrawal.
As a second reaction, one can reply that the problem emerges only if the universe
contains opposite entropy gradients. Such universes can of course be excluded, but as
long as the time direction is defined locally, the existence of globally opposing entrophy
gradients presents a fundamental possibility. Moreover, simply ruling out universes
with globally opposing time directions seems an ad hoc move to escape a systematic
problem.
Related to this second point, it may be noted that the above problems can be avoided
by respecting the principle of precedence PP, as formulated in Earman (1974), in carrying
out the reduction. This principle states that in an orientable spacetime, continuous time-
like transport of an orientation takes precedence over any method7 of fixing time direc-
tion. This principle is rightly criticized by Matthews (1979), but sticking to INT exactly
undercuts the reasons given by Matthews for discarding the principle. If we take the
orientation of enantiomorphs to be intrinsic, local definitions of time direction are
problematic. Since a local definition opens up the possibility of directions that oppose
each other globally, we then allow that enantiomorphs which have opposite temporal
orientations within a certain region have the same temporal orientation after translation
of one of them. So, holding onto INT is a good reason for endorsing PP. In any case, adopt-
ing this principle means that, at least partly, we give up the reduction of time direction.
Recall that in the discussion on time asymmetry, it mattered whether processes are
characterised with state descriptions that contain change-related properties. Let me
briefly come back to this to relate it to the intrinsic orientation of processes and their
role in this discussion. It is convenient to distinguish two possibilities. The first is that
the change-related properties reflect only between the perspective of the observers. In
that case, there is no intrinsic difference between a state and the transformed, tempo-
rally opposite state. The use of change-related properties in state descriptions is then
irrelevant to the discussion in this section. The second possibility is that states and their
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temporal opposites differ intrinsically. Using change-related properties in state
descriptions then amounts to supplying a process with intrinsic orientation via its state
descriptions. But in that case, these state descriptions must accord with the locally
defined direction of time, which means that we can reiterate the above problems. If, on
the other hand, the state descriptions do not accord with the locally defined direction
of time, we have simply not managed to perform the reduction.
These last remarks reveal the structure of the problem for reductionism in its most
elementary form: it is impossible to reduce the direction of time to other notions while
at the same time maintaining that the orientation of processes in time is somehow
intrinsic, and therefore independent of these notions.
8. Reductive Explanations of Asymmetry
This section considers explanations of the consistent orientation of time-asymmetric
processes. It turns out that such explanations are facing the same dilemma as derived
for enantiomorphy in space. Reductive explanations of time asymmetry are therefore
tied to the view that the orientation of the asymmetric processes is ontologically inde-
terminate.
Let me first characterise reductive explanations of the consistent orientation of time-
asymmetric processes. Explanations of this kind are widespread in physics, in particu-
lar for thermodynamical and radiative processes. One of the earliest examples is the
branching hypothesis by Reichenbach, which explains the consistent orientation of
thermodynamical processes by reference to a global time-asymmetric process. Other
reductive explanations can be found in Davies (1977), Horwich (1987), Zeh (1992),
Halliwell, Perez-Mercader, and Zurek (1994), Savitt (1995), and Price (1996). The
general characteristic of the explanations is that they give an account of the alignment
of the orientation of certain time-asymmetric processes in terms of an underlying
theory that does not refer to a specific direction of time or a specific orientation in time.
The following argues that these cannot be combined with the view that the orientations
of the processes are determinate, as expressed in the claim DET.
The conflict becomes apparent once we recall that enantiomorphy in space leads to
a dilemma: we must either deny DET or in some way accept orientation as a basic
notion, and thus deny the reductionist tenet RED. Now, in the case of time-asymmetric
processes in spacetime, we are presented with the very same dilemma, and there are
again a number of ways to choose the second option. We may give primitive identity
to spacetime points and deem one end of spacetime ‘the future’, or incorporate rela-
tions between processes that refer, explicitly or implicitly, to orientation. However, if
we assume reductive explanations of the consistent orientation of time-asymmetric
processes, the option to deny RED does not seem available: the account of the processes
is not supposed to include any reference to orientation as a basic notion. It therefore
seems that within such reductive explanations, we are forced to embrace the view that
orientations are indeterminate.
It is important to keep in mind the import of the claim that the orientation of processes
is determinate, as elaborated in Sections 5 and 6. Recall that the determinateness is
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supposed to be ontological. This means that the processes come in two distinct orien-
tations, say + and −, and that, possibly relativised to the setting, there is an element of
reality that corresponds to the specific orientation of each process. It must be noted that
this is not to deny the point of Huggett (2000, 224) and Pooley (2003, 257) that labelling
an enantiomorph with a particular orientation involves an element of convention. I do
not contend that once we have two oppositely oriented enantiomorphs available, we can
provide a consistent labelling for all the enantiomorphs. To assert this possibility is to
say that we can consistently identify the orientations, but it is not to say that there is a
fact of the matter, or an element of reality, to the specific orientation of enantiomorphic
objects once the incongruent counterparts are both present. In fact, both Huggett and
Pooley seem to deny the existence of such an element of reality.
It may be argued, independently from the labelling, that the mere existence of oppo-
sitely oriented processes in spacetime can provide the ontological basis for the orienta-
tions. But, following the discussion of Remnant, I do not see how this can work. If we
imagine a lone hand in otherwise empty space without further orientation, the problem
is fairly clear. There is nothing that can base the orientation of the hand, so maintaining
DET, by saying that the lone hand is, for example, a left one, is problematic. Now imag-
ine two hands in otherwise empty space. What can be the reason for the one, and not
the other, to come out as the left hand? It seems that conceptually, we have not gained
anything with the presence of a second hand. Certainly, with two oppositely oriented
hands in space, it is indisputable that the hands are enantiomorphic objects, and incon-
gruent counterparts of each other. But there is simply nothing in a relationist account
without oriented relations, or in an account using space points without primitive iden-
tity, that determines one of the hands as left. The same holds for processes in spacetime,
or so I argue. In a reductionist account of processes, the orientations are ontologically
indeterminate, simply because the ontological basis for the orientations is lacking. The
presence of multiple, oppositely oriented processes in spacetime does not help against
that.
Here, it is perhaps illuminating to consider the attempt to define a global direction
of time in terms of the orientation of a specific asymmetric process, namely the evolu-
tion of the universe. As the evolution of the universe is by definition a single process in
otherwise empty spacetime, the above problem is analogous to the original puzzle of
Kant concerning the lone hand. The point is that in any reductive account, it is impos-
sible to distinguish this evolution from its incongruent counterpart. Of course, no
sentient being will ever notice the difference between a time-asymmetric evolution and
its incongruent counterpart. But it is a different thing to say that there is no such differ-
ence. Again, employing the analogy with spatial enantiomorphy, we may be happy to
deny the difference between oppositely oriented office chairs in otherwise empty space,
but denying the difference between a left and a right slipper is, prima facie, not as
uncontroversial.8
Finally, there is an interesting connection between problems with reductive explana-
tions of the consistent orientation of time-asymmetric processes on the one hand, and
explanations of the consistent orientation of the violation of parity symmetry in sub-
atomic physics, as discussed in Hoefer (2000) and Pooley (2003), on the other. Let me
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repeat how Hoefer (2000, 252) puts it, for the moment ignoring the anthropomorphic
character of the expression: it is something of an explanatory mystery how B-mesons
manage to select the same orientation for their mirror-asymmetric decay consistently.
Now, in the case of time-asymmetric processes, the reductive explanations do account
for the fact that the orientations align. But as I have argued here, in explaining the even-
tual orientation of time-asymmetric processes, we are facing the very same mystery as
in B-meson decay.
9. Conclusion
This article discusses the enantiomorphic character of processes in spacetime, and with
insights deriving from the debate on spatial enantiomorphy, it presents some problems
for reductionism in the discussion of the direction of time.
In more detail, I first show that on a certain definition of processes, time-asymmetric
processes are enantiomorphic objects in spacetime. Then, I discuss the problem of
enantiomorphs in space, in order to introduce some positions concerning enantiomor-
phy, and to show that it entails the dilemma of either denying reality to the orientation
of enantiomorphs, or supplying space or objects with further oriented properties. This
discussion is subsequently carried over to the discussion on time, where I show that
reductionists about the direction of time are tied to a denial of orientation being intrin-
sic. I further show that reductive explanations of time-asymmetric processes presup-
pose that the orientation of enantiomorphic processes is indeterminate.
The two results on reductionism are probably best taken as a further motivation to
adopt the position that incongruent counterparts are not intrinsically different, and
further that their orientation is not determinate. This already seems to be the consensus
view among philosophers, and the price for maintaining INT and DET in the spacetime
case again seems high: the impossibility of a locally defined time direction, and prob-
lems with reductive explanations of the orientation of processes in time. Still, against
the above theoretical reasons, the firm intuition of most philosophically untrained
minds remains that a hand is determinate in being left or right, and made determinate
by its very constitution.
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Notes
[1] If the folding exercise is confusing, it is also possible to imagine knee (b) going round a
Möbius band by rigid motion.
[2] It seems possible to provide a definition of enantiomorphy that does not depend on rigid
motions, along the lines of Möbius (1991): an object is enantiomorphic in n-dimensional
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space if and only if it is not uniquely characterised by  distances between its labelled parts.
But for the present purpose, this definition is less suitable.
[3] The present result may be connected to the remark of Wittgenstein (1921) in Tractatus
6. 36111: ‘Das Kantsche Problem von der rechten und linken Hand…besteht schon…im
eindimensionalen Raum’. It is because in Minkowski spacetime, the time component is in a
sense a separate one-dimensional space that time-asymmetric processes are enantiomorphic.
[4] It seems that in an n-dimensional space, a relation that refers to orientation must involve at
least n + 1 points. We may make ORI-R more specific by means of this.
[5] Smart (1964) advances an argument comparable with that of Remnant. The same responses
apply to his position.
[6] As a nice parallel, this is just as counterintuitive as Mach’s view on the inertia of mass, which is
also supposed to suddenly vanish when there are no other masses present in the universe.
[7] Matthews (1979) quotes Earman as saying ‘any other method’ and accuses Earman of suggest-
ing that PP is a method, too, while PP is just a consistency requirement. But Earman’s text
reads ‘any method’.
[8] The difference may give rise to an argument similar to Leibniz’s argument against Newtonian
absolute space: there is no sufficient reason to create either the universe or its incongruent
counterpart.
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